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The provision of public inputs in a federation under asymmetric information 
 
Günter Krause 









In recent years informational problems have been introduced into local public finance. The 
main impetus of the analyses has been on the supply of local public goods, often under tax 
competition. The present paper extends recent contributions to study how inter-regionally 
mobile capital supplied by the first-period consumption-savings decision of the private sector 
is taxed in a closed federation to fund well informed local governments that differ in their 
costs of providing public inputs. The modified Samuelson-conditions for the optimal supply 
of local public inputs are derived and analyzed for different informational environments and 
instrumental abilities of the federal government. There exists a tendency to oversupply the 
public input in the low cost region which is also present in a numerical simulation where 
different informational environments are compared to the first-best and tax competition. 
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Oates [17] and Tiebout [20] have based the idea of the advantages of federally organized 
governments on two basic tenets: (1) decentralized government entities have better access to 
information which is locally relevant. (2) central government has to employ uniform levels of 
taxes or services irrespective of local conditions. However, in many theoretical contributions 
studying the basic problem of policymaking in a federal state, neither informational problems 
nor differences in regional circumstances have played a role.  
 
The theoretical literature in local public finance has only recently begun to incorporate 
informational problems into the traditional analysis of mobile tax bases, tax competition and 
the efficient supply of local public goods and public factors. 
 
Recent contributions incorporating asymmetric information are Boadway/Horiba/Jha [3], 
Bucovetsky/Marchand/Pestieau [6], Lockwood [15], Cremer/Marchand/Pestieau [10], 
Bordignon/Manasse/Tabellini [4], Raff/Wilson [18] and Dhillon/Perroni/Scharf. [11]. The 
focus of the majority of these papers has been on the role of informational asymmetries in the 
provision of local public goods and their effects on redistributional policies in a federation.  
 
Cornes/Silva [7,8,9] in a series of contributions have analyzed asymmetric information in a 
federation, where local governments have informational advantages vis a vis the federal 
government. In their analyses, however, there are no mobile private activities between the 
regional economies. Transfers can only be effected by the federal government. 
 
Lockwood [15] discusses the possibilities of interregional insurance with and without possible 
spillovers of local public goods, given informational asymmetries over preferences for local 
public goods, costs of providing these public goods and local endowments. 
 
Dhillon/Perroni/Scharf [11] discuss problems regarding the supply of public goods. They 
study the possibility of Bayesian implementation of a tax coordination scheme when there is 
no legal tax harmonization, but where countries can benefit from voluntarily coordinated tax 
policy. This would correspond to the unified federal tax on capital income in the present 
paper.   2
 
Only Raff/Wilson [18] have studied the question of public inputs (e.g. infrastructure) under 
asymmetric information in the context of factor mobility. In their analysis labor is a mobile 
factor and a central government, with a redistributive objective, has to consider informational 
advantages of local governments in implementing an optimal allocation of transfers across 
regions to maximize a utilitaristic welfare function of immobile landowners and mobile 
workers. Their local government has a lump sum tax at its disposal to finance the local input. 
 
The classic reference is Zodrow/Mieszkowski [27] who derived an inefficiency result of local 
underprovision of public inputs based on an assumption about the production function. Their 
result has been generally derived by Matsumoto [16]. Keen/Marchand [12] have studied the 
impact of tax competition on the composition of local expenditures on local public goods and 
local public inputs, again in a context of symmetric information and countries. Their main 
result is that for any given tax revenue the expenditure mix is biased towards local public 
inputs in a vain attempt to attract additional capital. 
 
The present paper deviates from this perspective in several instances. First, it studies the 
problem of the central/federal government as a revelation game, where the local governments 
first reveal their type to the center which implements an allocation of capital taxes and local 
public inputs based on the messages received. It takes into account that private capital is 
perfectly mobile across regions. Furthermore, the federal government can only levy a capital 
tax, which distorts the savings decision of the private agents. This approach from the tax 
competition literature rules out taxes on lump-sum incomes either on a local or federal level. 
This contrasts with much of the literature where local governments often can levy a local 
lump-sum tax and need federal funds only to supplement their expenditures or because they 
act only in the interest of local residents who receiver the rent income. It is similar to the 
situation in the Federal Republic of Germany where Länder governments have practically no 
local source of revenue.  
 
In contrast to Raff/Wilson [18] the federal government only serves in an efficiency enhancing 
capacity by levying a federal tax and thus possibly obviating the need to levy local source 
based capital taxes that are at the heart of the classical underprovision result of 
Zodrow/Mieszkowski [27].    3
The main role of the federal government would be that of an agent that is able to collect the 
revenue in a more efficient way and then transfer the money to the local authorities to spend. 
The center acts as an agent of the regions (tax collector) and is used to increase the efficiency 
of tax collection. Local governments nevertheless have an incentive to cheat on the collector. 
They may misrepresent their status. For example, in a recent decision East Lansing, MI, 
declared an area of the city as blighted in order to get additional state subsidies for its 
expenditures policy in that area. Another example is the recent discovery that state 
governments have been cheating the federal government by misrepresenting their Medicare 
expenditures in order to get a larger matching payment from the federal government. This was 
done by making a statement about planned state expenditures and then not actually paying 
them after receiving federal money. It could also be done by overpaying local providers of 
public inputs. This is the approach followed by Besfamille [2]. The local government can hire 
local providers at higher prices or grant them costly favors which makes it seem as if the 
provision of public inputs in the low cost regions was as expensive as in the high cost region. 
 
The paper is organized as follows:  
 
First, the formal model of a (closed) federation with two types of small regions is presented. 
Regions differ in their productive possibilities to transform private goods into public inputs. 
There exist low- and high-cost regions. Regional governments know their own cost type but 
the federal government does not. After the general equilibrium effects of the tax instruments 
are explored, the problem of the federal government under complete information is solved as 
a case of reference. In this environment, the federal government will set optimal investment 
for public inputs according to the rule: marginal productivity = marginal costs of public funds.  
The latter are greater than one because the capital income tax reduces the rate of interest and 
hence aggregate savings in the federation. A condition is derived which guarantees that 
uniform taxation of capital will be optimal under symmetric information. 
 
The role of asymmetric information is then considered based on a direct revelation game, 
where the federal government implements a transfer-public investment scheme based on 
regional messages about types. Local governments misrepresenting their type can transfer 
excess payments from the federal government to their representative resident for 
consumption. Therefore, any welfare loss by a forced expenditure of local government 
surpluses in a non-utility maximizing way is ruled out. They are not able, however, to finance   4
any deficit which would result from misrepresentation by means other than the federal 
transfer. 
 
It is demonstrated that under these assumptions a pooling equilibrium in public inputs is not 
possible. Further, it is shown that the incentive compatibility constraint of the low-cost region 
will be binding. 
 
With uniform capital taxation, the investment rules for public inputs are derived. The input 
decisions for low-cost regions, contrary to standard results of no distortion at the top, will be 
distorted to take into account the impact of local public inputs on the informational rent 
received. The reason for this is that in a general equilibrium model, the direct effect of public 
inputs on productivity and hence utility in low cost regions will be dampened by increased 
rental payments to the (capital exporting) high cost regions for the capital employed. Input 
decisions in high cost regions will be distorted to take into account the necessary increases in 
the informational rent paid out to low cost regions. 
 
If the federal government also has an additional local tax on capital at its disposal, it turns out 
that the public input decision of the low cost regions will no longer be distorted, i.e. no 
distortion at the top will hold with respect to public inputs. However, the capital input in the 
low cost region will now be subsidized. This counteracts the tendency to reduce the stock of 
capital in low cost regions, because of the informational rent concerns. The input decision for 
the high cost regions then has to absorb all distortions, those for the direct impact of the 
informational rent and also those of the capital subsidy. 
 
A general welfare analysis in section 5 argues that the objective of the federal government 
will achieve a higher value, if it is able to levy a differentiated capital tax. This implies that 
the general conclusion of uniform capital taxes under symmetric information may no longer 
hold under asymmetric information between the federal government and local governments 
over important aspects of local economies. 
 
Finally, a numerical simulation in a very much simplified model with only two regions and 
taxation of capital and capital income demonstrates the possibility that with uniform capital 
income taxation, public inputs may be oversupplied relative to the first best in the low cost 
region. Furthermore, it illustrates potential conflicts of interests between low cost and high   5
cost regions in forming a federation, as low cost regions may “win” under tax competition in 
the sense that the tax competition equilibrium may give them higher utility than either the first 
best or a federation with or without informational problems and employing distortionary 
taxes. 
 
A short summary concludes. 
 
2. The structure of the model 
2.1. The private sector 
We consider a federation composed of N regions. There exist two types of regions, H  and L, 
with  H n  and  L n ,  HL nnN +=, denoting the respective number of regions. They differ in their 
costs of providing local public inputs, e.g. infrastructure. We assume that use of the 
infrastructure, P , is completely nonrival. We proceed by first describing the private sector of 
each region and then the situation of the local governments. 
 
Each region i is inhabited by an immobile representative agent. He derives utility from 
private consumption in the first and second period. His utility function is 
(1)   12 1 2 (,) ()
ii i i UC C uC C =+ .
1 
He maximizes his utility subject to his budget constraint 
(2)  2 (1 )
ii i i Cr S π α =+ + +. 
The assumption of a quasi-linear utility function is common both in agency problems as well 
as in the analysis of public goods as the presence of income effects severely complicates the 
analysis.
2 The agent can invest his savings 
i i i C W S 1 − = , where 
i W  denotes his endowment 
of a representative consumption good in the first period, in all regions and receives the net 
rate of interest r from doing so.
3 We assume that the representative agent is the sole owner of 
the representative firm in his region or state and thus all profit/rental income  i π accrues to 
him. Finally,  0
i α ≥  denotes a possible transfer payment from government i to agent i. 
                                                 
1 We denote agents or regions with superscripts and all other variables with subscripts. 
2 See, e.g. Laffont/Tirole [13], who use quasi-linear utility throughout. 
3 As we consider only a federal capital income tax it does not matter whether this tax is levied as a source-based 
or a residence-based tax.   6
 
In the present model with a complete capital market, the Fisher separation holds. Therefore, 
maximization of (1) subject to (2) gives the following savings function of the private agent, 
(1 )
ii SS r =+ . We assume throughout that  









Taking the profit as given, the indirect utility function of the agent is 
 
(4) 
( (1 ( , , , , )), (1 ( , , , , ), , , ), )
(,,,, ,)
iF i j i j F i j i j F i i i
F i jiji
V V S r tt tP P r tt tP Ptt P








ii tP  are the local tax on capital income and the locally provided public inputs and 
F t  
denotes the federal capital tax.  ,




To simplify the analysis and abstract from distributionary concerns between regions, we 
assume that both types of agents are endowed with an identical amount  L H i W W
i , , = =  of 
the first-period consumption good. Therefore, both savings functions are identical. 
 
In his role as entrepreneur of the representative firm in region i, the agent maximizes profits, 
taking the level of local public inputs,
i P , the rate of interest r  and the tax rates on capital 
income, ,
iF tt, as given: 
 
(5)     ( , ) (1 )
ii i i i i F i F K P r Kt Kt K π =− + − −  
 
Here ) , ( i i P K F denotes a neoclassical production function with decreasing returns to scale 
that exhibits the Inada conditions. The formulation in (5) assumes that the private firm is 
charged no price by the local government for the use of the public inputs 
i P . A user charge 
based on the level of public inputs available would change the informational structure of the 
                                                 
4 We suppress the effect of the number of regions 
H n  and 
L n  from the formula, because we will keep these 
constant throughout.   7
model and allow the implementation of matching grants, because such payments would give 
additional information to the federal government.  
 
We assume that neither the federal government nor the local governments are able to tax local 
profits directly.
5 The maximization of (5) then gives the local capital demand function 
((1 ) ; )


























The equilibrium rate of interest in the federation is then determined by equalizing capital 
demands and savings: 
 
(6)   (1 ; ) (1 ; ) ( ) (1 )
LL L F L HH H F H H L n K rt tP n K rt tP n nS r + ++ + + ++ = + + 
 
Given the partial effects of the regional instruments and knowing both savings functions, we 
can derive the total effects of the instruments on the equilibrium rate of interest by totally 
differentiating (6) with respect to the instruments 
(6') 
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j K  denotes the partial derivative of the demand for capital in region i with respect to 














From the assumptions above it follows that  ( ) 0
LL HH L H
rr r nK nK n n S ∆ =+ − + <  





















                                                 
5 This is in contrast to Raff/Wilson [18] 
6 Note that the impact is not equal to –1, because we have assumed an increasing savings function which absorbs 
part of the effect of the federal tax 






















2.2. The local government 
 
In a model of strategic tax competition (for a recent example see Bayindir-Upmann [1]) a 
regional government would use these dependencies in determining its optimal policies, given 
its assumptions on the reaction of the other regions.
7 We will, however, assume that 
individual regions do not take into account their influence on the federal tax rate but view 
themselves as small regions without any influence on the federal tax and interest rate.
8 
 
In our simplified setting without a local source of revenue, the main function of a regional 
government is to determine its budget by sending a message  ˆ θ  to the federal government 
about its type/needs. In order to generate some leeway for local actions, we assume that the 
federal government does not actually know the true type of individual regions. 
 
The optimization problem of a local government is to determine the message. Given the 
transfer schedule announced by the federal government this determines the transfer it will 
receive, the transfer payment to its citizen and the level of local public inputs to be provided. 
To generate a meaningful problem of asymmetric information we need two unobservable 
local characteristics. We assume that the federal government is not able to observe private 
final consumption besides the cost parameter in any region. 
 
Another approach would be to let the regional government provide a local public good. Then 
the mix of expenditures for the regional government would be the object of study.
9 In the 
                                                 
7 This approach is also taken in the numerical exploration at the end of the present paper. 
8 It is doubtful, if this reasoning would still hold in a federation with large differences in regional size. If one 
views the European Union as a federation, it seems plausible that Germany or France as regions might both have 
and try to use their influence on the European interest rate. Especially as there does not exist a European federal 
tax authority. 
9 See Keen/Marchand [12] for a study of this problem with symmetric information and tax competition.   9
present context, however, we wish to focus on the supply of public inputs, possible 
informational rents and the distortionary role of tax instruments in use in the federation. 
 
We now state formally how regions differ: we assume that the difference between L- and H-
type regions lies in a cost parameter  } , {
H L θ θ θ ∈  that determines the transformation between 
private goods and public inputs. The local government of region i wishes to maximize the 
indirect utility function of its representative agent 
 
(7)  ˆˆˆ (,() , () ,() )
i F ii ii ii VV t t P θ θα θ = , 
 
subject to its budget constraint 
 
F ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () () ( 1 () , () ) () ()0
ii ii i ii ii i ii ii Tt K r tt P P θθ θ θ θ θ α θ ++ + +− − ≥  
 
and the instrumental constraint  ˆ ()0
ii αθ ≥ . 
 
{ } ˆ ,
iL H θ θθ ∈  denotes the message about its type (e.g. rate of transformation) which it sends 
to the federal government. 
i θ  denotes its true type (e.g. rate of transformation). With two 
types (H and L) and the assumption 
L H θ θ >  , this implies that type L has to sacrifice fewer 
units of the private good to provide the same amount of public inputs than does type H.
10 The 
actual amount of public inputs provided,  ) ˆ (
i
i P θ , depends on the message to the federal 
government, because we assume that the federal government can observe both the stock of 
private capital and the marginal product of capital in order to levy a tax on capital income. 
 
Finally,  ˆ ()
i α θ  denotes the transfer of possible excess receipts from the local government to 
the local private sector. This formulation implies that the local government does not prefer 
bureaucratic waste, as such, but would use local budgetary surpluses in a welfare maximizing 
way, i.e. to maximize the welfare of its representative agent. If such transfers actually do 
happen, a welfare loss will nevertheless result, because of the excess burden of the capital tax.  
 
                                                 
10 Hence the single-crossing property holds.   10
We also note that the local government has no local source of revenue. This implies that in the 
welfare maximization problem of the federal government it is necessary to impose the 
restriction that  0 ≥
i α  for both types of regions. Otherwise, a negative 
i α  would imply a local 
lump sum tax on local profits. In the present setting, no federal tax on capital to finance the 
local public inputs would be needed, if such a local lump sum tax was available. 
 
In the present setting with only two types of governments, local governments have a binary 
choice about the message they send to the federal government. Either a local government tells 
the truth or it misrepresents its type. We can therefore incorporate the local choices into the 
problem of the federal government by adding standard truth telling or incentive compatibility 
constraints. 
 
As a point of reference we will start with the second-best situation (without informational 
constraints) before we proceed to third-best (with informational problems). 
 
3. The problem of the federal government with complete information  
 
In this section we present the problem of the federal government if it encounters no 
informational problems. We assume that the federal government maximizes an additive social 
welfare function that is the sum of the utilities of both regions subject to the relevant 
constraints. Hence the Lagrangian of the federal government is to maximize 
 
(10)    
[.] [.]
(( 1 [ . ] , ) )
(( 1 [ . ] , ) )
(( ) ( ) )
CI L L H H
LL L L L FL L L
H HH H HF H H H
FL H H H L L
Zn V n V
Tt K r tt P P
Tt K rtt P P





++ + + + −




subject to the capital market equilibrium, which is implicit in the presence of the equilibrium 
rate of interest in (10).
11 
12 
                                                 
11 The capital market equilibrium itself contains the optimal investment decision by the representative firms and 
the savings decisions by both private agents. 
12 We have also incorporated the fact that no local transfer incomes will be paid in this situation, because 
financing them incurs a welfare loss. I.e., we have set  0
LH αα = = .   11
 
The first order conditions of (10) with respect to the capital taxes are: 
(11)
L t :   ()0
LH
LL L L L H H F F H L
LL L
dK dK dS
nK K t t t n n
dt dt dt
λλ λ
    −+ + + + + =    
   
 
(12)
H t :  ()0
LH
HH LL H H H F FH L
HH H
dK dK dS
nK t K t t n n
dt dt dt
λλ λ
    −+ + + + + =    
   
 
(13)
F t :  
() ()0
LH
HH LL LL H H
FF
FL H F HL
F
dK dK
nK nK t t
dt dt
dS





−−+ +   
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r ii i i
dK K K dr dr
K
dt t r dt dt








= ,  1
iii
i
r FF F F
dK K K dr dr
K
dt t r dt dt
∂∂  =+ = +  ∂∂ 
, 
, iL H = , 
and the reaction of savings to taxes,  ,, ; rr ii FF
dS dr dS dr
Si L H S
dt dt dt dt
== = , as well as the capital 
market equilibrium, only two of these three equations are independent. Therefore, we drop 
F t  
from the problem to inquire what regional taxes the federal government will set in 
equilibrium. 
L T  and 
H T  will then be used by the federal government to allocate the tax 
revenues as needed between the two groups of regions. Hence we can rewrite the problem of 
the central government as 
 
(10`)    
[.] [.]
(( 1 [ . ] , ) )
(1 [.] , )
CI L L H H
LLL L L LL
L
HH H H H H H
H
Zn V n V
tK r t P T P
n





++ + − −
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based on the presumption that the federal government will transfer money T  from the low 
cost regions to the high cost regions to balance the budgets. (11) and (12) simplify to 
 
(11`)
L t :  0
LH
LL L L L H H
LL
dK dK




−+ + + =   
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   12
(12`)
H t :  0
LH
HH LL H H H
HH
dK dK




−+ + + =   
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Furthermore, we get 






λλ −+ =  
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= .  
 
The transfer of revenue by the federal government leads to the equalization of the marginal 
cost of public funds (MCPF) for both types of regions. 
 
Using (17) to solve (11`) for 
LL nK and then dividing it by 
LL nK and doing the same in (12`) 
wrt 
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 (18) can be simplified to  

























rrr ε εε == , we get 
 




















Hence we have 
 
Result 1: If the elasticity of the demand for capital is identical and constant in both regions, 
the optimal tax rates chosen by the federal government under symmetric information will be 
equal,  
(20) 
** HL ttt == . 
 
( A sufficient condition for the optimal tax rates to be equal in both regions is that the 




From now on, we will assume that the production function exhibits this property. 
 

















                                                 
13 If we set 
LH ttt ==  in (18`), this implies that  0 r S =  for the equation to hold, independent of the values of 
,, .
i K



















ε =>  denote the elasticities of the rate of interest wrt to 
the respective public inputs.  
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These equations reveal that there are two countervailing tendencies at work in deciding the 
level of public inputs provided in both types of regions.  
 
First, there is a tendency to provide less than the optimal amount of public inputs, because the 
MCPF are greater than one for both regions. Equating the real benefits of additional 
infrastructure ( )
i
P F  to the real (physical) marginal cost ( )
i θ  would therefore not be optimal. 
On the other hand, there exists a mitigating effect of providing infrastructure on the tax base, 
which tends to increase the optimal amount in the two types of regions. How strong this 
mitigating effect is depends on the inverse share of the spending on infrastructure in one type 
of region (the higher the total share the less effective the mitigating effect). Furthermore, the 
stronger the reaction of the savings to an increase in the rate of interest and the stronger the 
increase in the rate of interest for a given increase in the level of public inputs, the stronger 
will be the mitigating effect. 
 
We now proceed to study the problem of the government under incomplete information, i.e., 
when the actual type of any region is private information which only the local government of 
that region knows. 
 
4. The problem of the federal government with incomplete information 
4.1. Uniform taxes on capital 
   15
Based on the result of the previous section, we first analyze the decision of the federal 
government when it employs a uniform tax on capital throughout the federation. 
 
When the federal government does not know the type of an individual region, it has to take 
into account that a region may misrepresent itself in its message to the federal government. 
Analytically, it has to take into account incentive compatibility constraints known from 
agency theory to guarantee truth-telling by individual regions at the optimum. 
 
For a L-region this constraint is 
(24a)     
LHH L H VVT P θ ≥+−  
and for a H-region, it is 
(24b)     
H LLH L VV T P θ ≥+− . 
 
The economic intuition behind eqs. (24) is that any region must prefer a truthful message 
about its type to misrepresenting. Taking a typical L-region as an example, it will get utility 
L V  if it sends a truthful message. If it lies, it will get the utility of a H -region, because it will 
have an identical stock of public inputs and capital, identical profits and identical utility from 
savings. However, in addition to that it will have an excess of funds to transfer to its citizen 
for consumption. The reason for this is that it will receive a transfer from the federal 
government 
H T , but will need only 
LH P θ  to produce the amount of public inputs expected 
and observed from a H -region. 
 
We consider incentives in an existing federation and ignore therefore any participation 
constraints that may well be binding in the present situation.
14 Given the possible advantages 




To further abstract from possible problems with the local enforcement of federal taxes, we 
assume that all tax revenue accrues at the federal level. The federal government then transfers 
money to the regions in accordance with the type messages it has received. 
 
                                                 
14 See eg the recent paper by Cornes/Silva [7]. 
15 See Wilson [25,26], Bucovetsky/Wilson [5].   16




LL LL TP θ α =+  
(25b)  
H HH H TP θ α =+  
(25c)   ( )
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i iH L α ≥=  denote possible information rents that the two types of government 
may obtain. In our model, they do not waste these possible rents but give them as transfers for 
consumption to their representative agents.
16 The first order conditions of this problem are 
 
(27) 
F t :    
() ()
(( 1) ( 1) )
(( 1)( 1) ) 0
















 −− + ++ + 

+− ++ +
+− ++ + =
 
(28) 
L α :     0
LLL n λµ −+=  
(29) 
H α :   0
HHH n λµ −+=  
(30) 
L T :   0
LL F H n λλ µ −− =  
(31) 
H T :   0
HH F L n λλ µ −− =  
                                                 
16 This is different from the approach taken by Boadway et al. [3] where the informational rents are consumed by 
the local government and do not show up in the rest of the general equilibrium structure.   17
(32) 






















































In addition to this, the three budget constraints (25abc), the incentive compatibility constraints 
(24a, 24b) and the capital market equilibrium have to hold. 
 
The only solution to eqs. (28)-(31) has  1, , ,
FL L H H H H L H nn λ λµ λ µ µ µ == + = + = . 
However, using these values in (27), it simplifies to  
 







This equation implies that for (28) to (31) to hold,  1
F λ = , i.e., there must be no excess burden 
in raising money for the federal government. From (27’), this will be the case if either 












= , which would also violate the assumptions already made. 
Therefore not all of the above first order conditions can hold simultaneously. In line with the 
literature on information economics, we will assume that the truth-telling constraint on the 
high cost type will not be binding at the optimum. Hence we will assume  0
HH µα ==  from 
now on. 
 
The economic reason for this is straightforward. Whenever the optimal infrastructure in L-
regions is higher than that in H-regions, H-regions will not be able to misrepresent   18
themselves, if their additional production cost of mimicking L-regions, ( )
H LL P θθ −  is greater 
than the additional money L-regions get beyond their production costs, 
L α . It will be seen in 
the following analysis that the marginal cost of providing public inputs in the L-regions will 
be lower than in H-regions, hence at the optimum 
LH PP > , which implies 
LH KK > . 
Therefore L-regions also pay a rental payment of ( )
LH KK r −  to H-regions, which any lying 
H-region would have to incur, too. ( A H-region would go from paying 
H rK  for its capital 
employed to paying 
L rK , which is also a cost of misrepresentation.) 
 
Without 
H α  and 
H µ , the following system of equations determines the optimal solution of 
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L α : 0
LLL n λµ −+=  
(30`) 
L T : 0
LL F n λλ −=  
(31`) 
H T : 0
HH F L n λλ µ −− =  
(32`) 
L P : 
(( ) )
() 0
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(33`) 
H P : 
(( ) )
() 0















Again, the budget constraints (25abc), the incentive compatibility constraint (24a) of the low 
cost type and the capital market equilibrium have to hold. 
From (30’) we get  
 
  
LL F n λ λ = .  
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This implies that the marginal cost of public funds which will be imputed to the low cost 
regions is the true MCPF that the federal government incurs. One unit of tax money delivered 
to a single lost cost region incurs a MCPF for the federal government of 
F λ  times the number 
of regions that will get this additional money, 
L n . 
 
From (31`), together with (28) and (26’) we get  
 
   (1 )
HH F L F nn λλλ =+ − . 
 
The imputed MCPF for a high cost region are composed of two elements. First, as for low 
cost regions, are the social cost of providing the tax revenue to 
H n  regions. Second, the 
increase in a payment to the high cost regions makes it more attractive for low cost regions to 
misrepresent themselves. The federal government has to compensate for this, by increasing 
the informational rent it gives to the low cost regions. The social cost of financing these 
additional rents are measured by the term  ( 1)
LF n λ − . There are 
L n  low cost regions, which 
will get the additional rent payment. The welfare loss of such a payment to an individual low 
cost region is given by  1
F λ − , because one dollar of tax revenue costs the federal government 
F λ  dollars to raise, but in our model it will generate only one additional dollar of utility in 
private consumption in the low cost regions. 
 
That the MCPF is indeed greater than one in the present situation can be seen by using 
L λ  
and 
H λ  from above in (27’’) and solving for 
F λ : 
 
(34) 
() ( ) 1
1
() ( ) 1 ()
HL L H L
F
HL L H L LH
r
dr
nn S n KK
dt
dr dr
nn S n KK t nn S
dt dt
λ
 ++ − + 
 =>




F λ  will be greater than unity in the present situation, because  10
dr
dt
− << . From this it 
follows that the expression is positive and the denominator will be less than the numerator 
leading to an excess burden in raising revenue via the capital tax. 
 
Given this result, the optimal levels of public inputs in the low-cost regions will be 
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This can be simplified using 
H HH TP θ =  in the truth-telling-constraint and solving for 
L α : 
 
(36)   ( )
LHLH H L P α ππ θθ =− + − 
 
Abusing notation to depict the marginal impact the other variables have on the endogenous  
informational rent, we get 
 












Using this in (35), we get 
 
(35’)   () () 1
L












The level of public inputs in low cost regions will be determined by three factors. 
The first factor is the marginal physical cost of public inputs, 
L θ , times the MCPF. 
The higher the marginal cost or the MCPF, the lower the optimal level of public inputs 
L P .  
 
The second term captures the effect on the informational rent of an increase in the level of 
public inputs in the L-regions. Given that their stock of capital is higher than in the H-regions, 
the resulting increase in the rental payment compared to H-regions caused by the increase in 
the rate of interest provides an incentive for the L-regions to misrepresent themselves. This 
has to be compensated by a marginal increase in the informational rent, which causes an 
additional welfare loss of  1
F λ − . 
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− < , captures the positive effect of an increase 
in the level of public inputs on the federal tax base, which is positive and therefore provides a 
countervailing positive influence to increase public inputs in the L-regions. 
 
Using 
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This implies that the federal government will provide public inputs in the low cost region 
beyond the level it would, if it took into account only the physical marginal cost. The tax base 
effect dominates the rent effect in (35’). Whether the actual level is greater than the level the 
federal government would choose in the first-best scenario or in a world with distortionary 
taxes but without informational problems remains to be seen. 
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This equation is similar to (35) but for the denominator and the last term in brackets. More 
light can be shed on this equation, if we use (36) again and denote the partial effect on 
L α  of 
an increase in 
H P  as 
 
(39)     () ( )
L












Using (39) in (38) gives us 
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This equation shows that the level of public inputs in the high cost region will be influenced 
by three components as well.  
 
First, the actual cost of providing public inputs will be taken into account, given that the 
federal government has to use a tax with an excess burden to finance the expenditures of the 
H-type regions.  
 
Second, the federal government takes into account that an increase in the level of public 
inputs in the H-regions will necessitate an increase in the payments to the L-type regions to let 












for the numbers of both types of regions in the federation, will tend to decrease the level of 
public inputs in the H-regions, because it makes this provision more costly to the federal 
government and hence society. 
 










− , will mitigate the decision with a tendency 
to increase public inputs beyond the level that would be warranted by taking into 
consideration only the actual costs of providing them. 
We summarize these results as  
 
Proposition 1: Under asymmetric information about the costs of public inputs and using 
only a uniform tax on capital, the federal government will set public input levels 
according to (35``) and (38`). Both public input distortions will be distorted in two ways: 
(1)  to take into account the impact of public inputs on informational rents 
received by the low cost type 
(2)  to take into account the impact of public inputs on the federal tax base. 
The basic situation of uniform capital taxes can also be studied by viewing the following 
Figure 1, where for presentational simplicity the type parameter differentiates the regions in 
their fixed and not their variable cost of providing public inputs. The partial production 
function () F  takes into account that a higher level of P  will attract a higher stock of private 
capital which results in an additional increase in production. 
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Figure 1 here 
 
As shown, in a first-best situation, the federal government would implement an identical 
amount of infrastructure  * P  in both regions. They would get a budget equivalent to the 
distance 0-2. The government of the L-region is then able to transfer 1-2 back to its citizen for 
consumption. With lump-sum taxes this would be the maximal rent that would be possible for 
the L-type region. Gross final “income” before (federal) taxes in period 2 would then be 0-4 
in the L-region (remember that 1-2 is equal in size to 3-4 to denote the transfer  L α ) and 0-3 in 
the H-region. As the tax on capital incurs an excess burden, the provision of this maximal 
informational rent will in general not be optimal for the federal government. 
 
If the federal government would set the level of public inputs in the H-region to 
H P 1 , the L-
region would receive no informational rent. If it misrepresented its type, it would get a budget 
of 5-7 needing only 5-6 for production purposes and transferring back to the citizen 6-7. 
Being truthful it would get a budget of 0-1 and not be able to make a transfer back to its 
citizen. Both alternatives would result in a pre-tax level of goods 5-9 = 0-3. Such a low level 
of public inputs in the H-region would result in a rather high productivity of public inputs in 
this region (in 8). This result, low public inputs in the H-region, no informational rent for the 
L-region cannot, however, be ruled out in the present context. If the marginal costs of public 
funds are high enough, this can be an optimal solution. 
If the marginal productivity of public inputs in the H-region is sufficiently high, however, the 
provision of some informational rent to the L-region will be warranted. The reason for this 
rent can be seen if 
H P2  is the level of inputs in the H-region. A mimicking L-region would get 
a pre-tax level of 10-11, which also has to be supplied if it behaves truthfully. Hence 3-12 
would be the informational rent the L-region receives in that case.
17  
4.2. Differentiated capital taxes 
 
                                                 
17 The argument is only approximately correct, because the negative consequences for final consumption 
L C2 of 
the larger capital stock 
L K , i.e. a transfer to the H-region via  ) ( S K r
L −  given that  S K
L >  and a larger tax 
payment than the H-region of  ()
LH tK K −  are not included in the graph.   24
In this subsection we explore the optimal policies of the government when it has an additional 
instrument at its disposal, namely, if it is able to levy different taxes on the capital employed 
in the two types of regions. Given that the possible misrepresentation of the L-regions is the 
problem, we will analyze the policies of the federal government when it may levy a separate 
tax or subsidy on capital employed by low cost regions. 
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The first-order conditions of this problem are in general quite similar to the ones of problem 
(26), taking into account that we have already left out 
H α  and the truth-telling constraint for 
the H-type. The first-order conditions are 
 
(41) 
L α : 0
LLL n λµ −+=  
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(47) 
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From (41)-(43) we get the familiar 
 




HH F L F nn λλλ =+ −  
 
Using these to solve for 
L t  and 
F t  in (44) and (45), we get  
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 denoting the elasticity of the stock of capital in H-regions with 
respect to the rate of interest. Again,  1
F λ >  will hold in this environment.
18 However, (49) 
implies that the federal government will pay a subsidy for the use of capital in the L-regions. 
 
The intuition for the surprising property that the federal government is subsidizing capital 
employed in the L-regions is that this subsidy increases 
L π  and reduces 
H π . This reduces 
their willingness to misrepresent and hence reduces their informational rent.  
 
                                                 
18 There exists a 
L t , which makes  1
F λ = . However, this 
L t  will multiplicatively depend on 
F t . But it will 
imply  0
FL tt == , hence all budget constraints would be violated. Therefore,  1
F λ >  will hold again.   26
Using the expressions for 
L t  and
F t , we get the following results concerning the optimal 
provision of public inputs in the two types of regions: 
 
(46`)    
LL
P F θ =  
 































The federal government no longer distorts the public input decision in the low cost region. 
This is equivalent to the usual result of no distortion at the top of the type parameter 
distribution. 
 
However, it distorts the capital input decision. Subsidizing capital employed in the low cost 
region will make misrepresentation less attractive for the L regions.  
 
The input decision of the H-regions will be distorted in several intuitively reasonable ways.  
First, the actual cost of providing public inputs financed at social cost will betaken into 
account. Second, the impact on the informational rent of the L-regions will increase the cost 
of financing infrastructure in the H-regions. Third, the tax base effect will lower the effective 
marginal cost of providing additional public inputs 
H P . Finally, increasing 
H P  reduces the 
stock of capital the L-regions have at their disposal. Hence at the margin the subsidy will have 
to be increased for capital to stay where there are more public inputs available. This increases 
the calculated costs for providing infrastructure to the H-regions. 
 
We summarize this discussion as 
 
Proposition 2: Given asymmetric information and the ability to levy differentiated taxes 
on capital employed in both types of regions, the federal government will subsidize 
capital in the L-region. Furthermore, public inputs will be set according to (46`) and 
(47`), which imply that 
(1)  there will be no distortion in the input decision of the L-regions 
(2)  the input decision of the H -regions will incorporate all distortions   27
 
5. Welfare analysis 
 
An explicit welfare analysis in the present model is complicated by the general structure 
employed. Some general conclusions may be derived based on the observation of binding 
constraints. 
 
Welfare will be higher without informational constraints, as any information rents 
necessitated by them cause a welfare loss of  ( 1)
LF n λ −  at the margin, as long as distortionary 
taxes have to be employed. Without informational problems, either taxes could be reduced or 
more public inputs could be produced, increasing welfare. 
 
More interesting is the comparison between the two regimes in section four. Although a 
uniform tax on capital is optimal in section three, using only a uniform tax on capital under 
asymmetric information vis-a-vis a differentiated tax structure is likely to be welfare inferior. 
The reason for this is that problem (26) is a variation of (40) with the additional implicit 
constraint that 
LH ttt == . Adding another binding constraint cannot increase the value of the 
optimum of (26) compared to the value of the optimum of (40). 
 
   28
6. A numerical exploration 
 
To further study the implications of the model, we conduct a numerical simulation in a model 
that is similar to those that has already been used in the literature on tax competition.
19 There 
are only two regions, one of each type. In addition to a log-linear utility function, 
12 [] uL o g c c =+ , we assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas and of the form 
() () ,,
ii FA K P iH L
αβ
== .  
In the simulation we set  5 . = α  ,  25 . = β  and  10 = A . We employ the following cost function 
for the public inputs:  ( ) , ,
ii i i CP P i H L θ =+ = . In the table below we have employed  0
L θ =  
and 10
H θ = . Furthermore, the tax is levied not on the stock of capital but on capital income: 
(1 ) , ,
i tr K i HL += . 
 
The reason for this variation is purely computational. As we have to determine the capital 
market equilibrium of the private sector both in a tax competition model with heterogeneous 
types and in the model under asymmetric information, a given production function may either 
not allow the determination of an explicit equilibrium rate of interest or may prevent the 
typical problems of asymmetric information from arising.
20  
 
The endowment of the representative agents is set to  100 = W . Solving the model with these 
numerical values gives the following results for the model with asymmetric information: 
 
Table 1 here 
  
The first column refers to the reference case of complete information whereas the second 
column presents the results from the model with asymmetric information and a binding 
incentive compatibility constraint for the low-cost region. The third column depicts a tax 
competition situation where each regional government levies a source based capital income 
                                                 
19 See Bayindir-Upmann [1]. 
20 For the Cobb-Douglas production function and linear costs of 
ii P θ  the numerical structure resulted in an 
equilibrium where the H-region wanted to misrepresent itself but could not and the L-region could misrepresent 
but did not want to imitate the H-region. Hence a separating equilibrium without an informational rent for the L-
region could be maintained.   29
tax to finance its public inputs. Finally, in the last column a situation with lump-sum taxation 
is presented where each government gets the revenue to finance the optimal amount of public 
inputs. 
 
The numerical results reveal that a federal government will induce an oversupply of the public 
input in the low-cost region relative to the first-best level. The utility of both regions in the 
optimum under asymmetric information will be lower than in the first-best which is no 
surprise. The tax competition results, on the other hand, reveal that both regions would have 
divergent interests if they were to decide whether they should form a federation. The low-cost 
region profits from tax competition and would only reluctantly enter a federation with the 
high-cost regions but for other political reasons. 
 
Comparing the situation with and without informational asymmetries one sees that the sum of 
utilities is larger without informational problems but that the distribution is markedly different 
from that with asymmetric information. This would provide an incentive to the low-cost 
region to resist the implementation of measures designed to alleviate the informational 
asymmetries between itself and the federal government. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the present paper was to study the impact of asymmetric information and 
instrumental availability on the supply of local public inputs in a federation that has only a 
distortionary tax on capital at its disposal. Tax decisions are taken centrally and expenditure 
decisions are under the authority of well-informed local governments. This situation 
resembles the Federal Republic of Germany where the federal government is the main source 
of revenue for the Länder governments.  
 
It was shown that with uniform taxes on capital, public input decisions will be distorted for 
both types of regions to take into account the impact of these inputs on the informational rent 
of the L-cost regions and on the federal tax base. 
 
If the federal government is able to levy differentiated taxes on capital, it will subsidize 
capital employed in the low cost regions to reduce the informational rent. This is more 
efficient than distorting the public input decisions of the low cost regions in this instrumental   30
and informational environment. Public input decisions by high-cost regions will have to 
incorporate the effects pertaining to tax base, informational rent and capital subsidy payments. 
Based on a general discussion about binding constraints it is argued that differentiated taxes 
on capital are welfare superior to a uniform tax on capital under asymmetric information in 
the present structure. In the presence of a binding incentive compatibility constraint, welfare 
under asymmetric information will be less than in the second-best. 
 
A numerical exploration  revealed how the level under asymmetric information in both 
regions deviates from the second-best optimum and the first-best optimum. A surprising result 
was that in the optimum under asymmetric information the local public input may be 
oversupplied in the low-cost region relative to the first-best level. 
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Tax competition  First-best, H-
region pays  H θ   
r  0.687841 0.664229 0.780238  1.46535 
S   98.5462 98.4945 98.7183  99.3176 
L P   71.5992 74.1149 59.0131  72.7675 
H P   71.5992 68.8847 39.1375  72.7675 
L K   98.5462 100.296 114.038  99.3176 
H K   98.5462 96.6927 83.399  99.3176 
L U   212.542 217.476 225.262  217.92 
H U   212.542 207.476 191.481  207.92 
LH UU +   425.084 424.952 416.743  425.84 
t  1.13005 1.2059  L t :   0.663244   
     H t :  0.755136   
L T   71.5992 78.836  LL tr K:  59.0131   
H T   81.5992 78.885  H H tr K:49.1375    
L α    4.72109     
F λ   1.01669 1.01846  L λ :1.6805   
     H λ :2.69732   
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Figure 1 
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